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The distinction between organism and mechanism is often subtle or unclear and yet can prove 
to be fundamental to our understanding of the world. It has been tempting for many thinkers to 
seek to ‘understand’ all of reality through the lens of either the one or the other of these concepts 
rather than by giving both a place. This article sets out to argue that there is a substantial loss 
of understanding when either of these metaphors is absolutised to explain all causal processes 
and patterns in reality. Clarifying the distinction between the two may provide one more tool 
to grasp what is reductionist in many of the perspectives that have come to dominate public 
life and science today. This contention is tested on the quest for the design of self-replicating 
systems (i.e. synthetic organisms) in the nanotech industry. It is common that the concepts of 
organic functioning and mechanism are used imprecisely and in an overlapping way. This is 
also true of much scientific debate, especially in the fields of biology, micro-biology and nano-
science. This imprecise use signals a reductionist tendency both in the way that the organic is 
perceived and in terms of the distinctive nature of mechanisms.
Introduction
The distinction between organism and mechanism is often subtle or unclear and yet can prove 
to be fundamental to our understanding of the world. It has been tempting for many thinkers to 
seek to ‘understand’ all of reality through the lens of either the one or the other of these concepts 
rather than by giving both a place. This article sets out to argue that there is a substantial loss of 
understanding when either one of these metaphors is absolutised to explain all causal processes 
and patterns in reality. Clarifying the distinction between the two may provide one more tool to 
grasp what is reductionist in many of the perspectives that have come to dominate public life and 
science today. This contention is tested on the quest for the design of self-replicating systems (i.e. 
synthetic organisms), a central endeavour in nanotechnology today.
It is common that the concepts of organic functioning and mechanism are used imprecisely and 
in an overlapping way. This is also true for much scientific debate, especially in the fields of 
biology, micro-biology and nano-science. This imprecise use signals a reductionist tendency both 
in the way that the organic is perceived and in terms of the distinctive nature of mechanisms. 
This reduction results in a number of paradoxes both in science and in society. In biology, for 
example, the increased scientific understanding of the processes at the nano-scale has resulted in 
people situating cause in mechanistic causal chains rather than in causes seated in the distinctive 
realm of the organic (the cell as a centre of operation and top-down (function based) causal 
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Organisme en meganisme: ’n Onderskeid wat verlore gaan. Die onderskeid tussen organisme 
en meganisme is dikwels subtiel of onduidelik, maar nogtans kan hierdie verskil ’n groot 
invloed op ons verstaan van die wêreld hê. Dit was in die geskiedenis van die filosofie vir 
baie denkers verleidelik om die totale werklikheid deur die lens van slegs die een of die ander 
van hierdie metafore te probeer verstaan in plaas daarvan om albei hulle regmatige plek te 
gee. Hierdie artikel argumenteer dat daar ’n substansiële verlies aan begrip is as ’n mens 
slegs een van hierdie metafore verabsoluteer in ’n poging om alle oorsaak- en gevolgpatrone 
in die werklikheid te verklaar. ’n Duideliker onderskeid tussen hierdie twee konsepte kan 
waarskynlik ’n bydrae lewer om die reduksionistiese elemente in die hedendaagse denkwyses 
wat die wetenskap en die openbare lewe oorheers, te bepaal. Hierdie benadering word getoets 
aan ’n analise van die ontwikkelinge in die nanotegnologie waar gepoog word om sintetiese 
lewe en selfrepliserende sisteme te vervaardig. Dit kom algemeen voor dat die begrippe 
organisme en meganisme onnoukeurig gebruik word en, tot ’n mate, soms selfs oorvleuelend. 
Dit geld ook vir ’n groot deel van die huidige wetenskaplike debatte, veral in die biologie, 
mikrobiologie en nanowetenskap dissiplines. Hierdie onnoukeurige woordgebruik maak dit 
duidelik dat daar ’n reduksie plaasvind beide in die onderskeid tussen wat as organiese en dit 
wat as spesifiek meganiese eienskappe beskou word. 
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processes). At the same time, the more vague vocabulary 
of emergentism has entered biology as a mechanistic 
explanatory tool, whilst it provides little or no predictive 
capacity (Anderson 1972:394),1 paradoxically introducing an 
almost magical dimension in our understanding of how a 
strictly mechanistic process works. 
Though the choice has been made in this article to take the 
developments in nanotechnology and microbiology as a 
primary test case, the organism–mechanism distinction is 
equally relevant to social contexts. In social organisations, 
the use of the term ‘mechanism’ is often applied to things like 
double bookkeeping to keep people honest and multilayered 
management.2 These are often used to supplant or replace 
processes like relationships of trust and sense of honour. 
Propensities such as these (trust and honour) can reasonably 
be called organismic in the sense that they are natural, 
often pre-intentional processes of the human organism 
which function simultaneously, especially in the realm of 
interconnectedness at multiple dimensions of scale. Even 
evolutionary biologists and neuroscientists would argue that 
altruism and trust have some form of evolutionary origin and 
therefore are part of the natural organic realm (see Axelrod 
2006:130; Dawkins [1976] 1989:11; Trivers 1971:35). The 
paradox of using such mechanisms to supplant relational 
processes is that the cost of overheads can increase whereas 
the goal was to safeguard appropriate use of funds. It would 
seem that finding a legitimate place for both dynamics would 
be a better way to go.
Mechanismic versus organismic 
worldview
The terminology attempting to indicate an overarching 
worldview that is defined either by the organism metaphor 
or by the mechanism metaphor is not uniform. Organistic, 
organismic and organicism (and the commensurate forms 
of the term ‘mechanism’) have all been employed to this 
end (Venter 1997:41–60). Part of the difficulty with this 
terminology is that the traditional use of the ‘-ism’ ending 
to connote extreme or universalised perspective, is already 
part of the core terminology in this case, but is here simply 
referring to functioning wholes. This renders the terms 
‘organistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ ambiguous, either referring 
to organlike or machinelike or to a more worldviewish 
usage. From here on, I will use the terms ‘organismic’ and 
‘mechanismic’ to refer to the overarching worldview and the 
terms ‘organistic’ and ‘mechanistic’ to connote an absolutised 
or one-sided use of either metaphor in the more restricted 
context of a specific aspect or case of reality.
The tendency to take the biology-based term ‘organism’ and 
apply it to inorganic systems, perpetually moving wholes 
1.‘The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the 
ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the more the 
elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental laws, the 
less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the rest of science, 
much less society’ (Anderson 1972:394).
2.It is a fact that these mechanisms are a product of intention and therefore limited 
to the number of causal layers and interactions that we can neurally realise at any 
given moment, which distinguishes them from the kind of cause-and-effect patterns 
that belong with organistic interactions, which are not limited in the same way. 
or groups rather than individuals, has a long history. Many 
ancient worldviews included some form of organismic 
thinking, as do more recent variants of pantheistic and New 
Age philosophies. In these philosophies the movement of 
people and animals (i.e. organisms) is taken as a model and 
explanation of the movement of all other moving things, for 
example, the celestial bodies. We are then seen to be living 
inside a huge living entity that requires harmony in order 
to function. As Venter (1992:189–224) has emphasised, 
these pictures of how things work provide more than just 
explanations of the movement of celestial bodies; they also 
imply evaluations of things in the universe. If this system of 
heavenly bodies is an eternal living entity that has a direct 
influence on my life, they must somehow be omnipotent 
or divine. So we have to live in a way that pleases these 
powerful influences. When applied to group wholes, this 
view quickly breeds an absolutist view of the dynamics of the 
group, whatever scale size one is focusing on. An example 
can be found in the organismic social perspective of the 
likes of Mussolini (1938:18). Venter (1992:189–200) argues 
that the resurfacing tendency in the 20th century to have an 
organismic perspective (as in the New Age movement), has 
its roots in the new physics that has paradoxically opened the 
way to ancient pantheistic mysticism.
The inherent category confusion in organismic thinking 
which declares that all is organism, ends up reducing 
reality in a number of ways. For one it does not sufficiently 
allow for causal relationships at other levels of explanation. 
Dooyeweerd’s (2002:94, 241) suite of aspects of reality and 
his analysis of act structures would be a relevant reminder 
in this regard, situating laws of cause and effect in many 
layers from the numeric, spatial and kinematic up through 
the higher levels of behaviour caused by social processes etc. 
It also leads to a loss of both truly external (to the cosmos) 
influences and to a loss of situated or intention based causes 
inside the whole.
When machines working on wind-, water- and fire-based 
steam energy started to become more complex and seemingly 
self-perpetuated, a new model was found with which to 
represent the universe, and so the mechanismic worldview 
was born. If reality is a big machine, then the planets are not 
all defining or supreme and we can, once we understand their 
mechanics, employ their forces and perhaps even control 
them. More importantly, the machine-based perception of 
ourselves implies a similar potential for control, once the 
mechanics are understood, but lacks precisely a space for an 
acting self. This ends up undressing our existence, so that 
there is no space for an acting self and the real solutions are 
chemical and not intentional.
It is with the body–mind dualism of the enlightenment 
philosopher René Descartes that the machine metaphor 
could start to be applied as a key to understanding things 
that had formerly been defined by their being an organism or 
having an organism-like dynamic. This line of understanding 
was strengthened by Thomas Hobbes’s description of 
humans and society as a machine (Hobbes 1962:19, 55) and 
Page 2 of 8
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v78i2.1240http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 3 of 8
has subsequently been applied in the industrial revolution 
when people were organised in a machine-like fashion to 
enhance the tempo of production. This spurned a variety of 
mechanismic models of understanding economic processes 
and all other social interactions. Darwin was strongly 
influenced by this mechanismic tradition in economics. He 
especially linked the conflict or competition motive with 
discourse from the advances in technology as well as from the 
cultural practices of selection (farmers and pigeon breeders). 
All these elements contributed to the central concept of his 
theory: the metaphor of ‘naturalselection’ (Venter 1996:209).
How the machine metaphor came 
to be dominant even in biology
Descartes had taken the position that we need to incorporate 
a method of extreme scepticism to achieve certainty. 
Mathematics was the only science that was seen as successful 
in conquering scepticism (Strauss 1953:171). It was the 
kind of fundamental knowledge that would give humans 
power. What was happening here was that a fundamental 
shift was taking place in the natural law (right) idea as it 
had been understood in its development from Plato and 
Aristotle through the Middle Ages. This natural law idea was 
also influenced by Galileo in his formulation of the law of 
inertia, where movement was viewed as the natural state of 
things (Strauss 1953:10). Hobbes, who took over Descartes’s 
conviction that fundamental scepticism was necessary, 
extended this idea to humans and society: ‘for seeing life is 
but a motion of limbs … for what is the heart but a spring; 
and the nerves, but so many strings, and the joints, but so 
many wheels, giving motion to the whole’ (Hobbes 1962:19, 
55). This is a clear attempt at trying to understand the 
organic in mechanistic terms. Because of the basic attitude of 
scepticism, knowledge was not seen as concerned with ends 
(no teleology) any more. This loss of appreciation of goal- or 
purpose-based functioning resulted in a diminished interest 
in the goals that biological functions are driven by and 
therefore a preference for the mechanistic view arose (Strauss 
1953:171). For modernity, natural law had become the sealed-
off totality of nature, unchanging. This is in sharp contrast 
with natural law as Aquinas (1948) had still perceived it:
To the natural law pertains everything to which a man is inclined 
according to his nature. Now different men are inclined to different 
things; ... Therefore there is not one natural law. (q. 94 a. 4)
Aquinas certainly considered many things universal amongst 
humanity and therefore saw natural law as a fine basis for 
many conclusions as to what is true, though he did not see it 
as an impersonal structure, but as that which joined particular 
instances of justice to the Divine. The shift away from this 
conviction that was started with Descartes led to a scientific 
approach that presupposed that all laws describing the 
natural order could be distilled into mathematical formulas, 
building from the laws of interaction for the smallest parts 
upwards.
The result is a reduction to the model of mechanism or 
machine for all interactions of matter, not allowing for new 
constituents to enter at the organic level – or any other level, 
for that matter. This also does not allow for a causality that is 
situated in these higher layers. This mechanistic restriction has 
led to false expectations and a sterile approach within those 
disciplines that are defining the landscape for much of the 
research and engineering which is currently taking place also 
at the nanoscale. The nanoscale is where biology and physics 
meet and so this development has led to a mechanisation of 
the understanding of cause-and-effect relationships even in 
biology – the discipline that should have been the science of 
organic functioning par excellence. 
The difference between biological 
‘structures’ and human creations
One of the people who have spent time pondering the 
differences between things made by humans and that which 
we find in the organic realm as biology observes it is Robert 
Rosen. Rosen concludes the first chapter of his book Life itself 
with the remark: ‘So it happens that the wonderful edifice 
of physical science, so articulate elsewhere, stands today 
utterly mute on the fundamental question: What is life?’ 
(Rosen 1991:12). What he subsequently argues in his book 
is that: ‘the muteness of physics [with regard to the question: 
what is life?] arises from its fundamental inapplicability to 
biology’ (Rosen 1991:13). In his analysis, this inapplicability 
to biology has everything to do with the tendency of physics 
to restrict itself to mechanism, computability and that which 
is simulable. He formulates himself as follows: 
As we have seen, a contemporary physicist will feel very much 
at home in the world of mechanisms. We have quite deliberately 
created this world without making any physical hypotheses, 
beyond our requiring the simulability of every model. We have 
thus put ourselves in a position to do a great deal of physics, 
without having had to know any physics. That fact alone should 
indicate just how special the concept of mechanism really is. It 
is my contention that contemporary physics has actually locked 
itself into this world; this has of course enabled it to say much 
about the (very special) systems in that world, and nothing at 
all about what is outside. Indeed, the claim that there is nothing 
outside (i.e., that every natural system is a mechanism) is the sole 
support of contemporary physics’ claim to universality. (Rosen 
1991:212–213)
What Rosen articulates here is that the trend to simulate 
organic function with computational models indicates an 
underlying assumption that organism is nothing more than 
complex mechanism.
We are organisms but we make 
mechanisms
The products of human design would seem to be more 
mechanical than organic. This comes because abstraction 
and reduction are tools that we use to grasp or conceptualise 
things in the concrete world3 (Glas 2002:149). Though 
we are organisms for whom it is true that in some way 
everything is connected to everything (organism, species, 
population, environment, biosphere, etc.), the complexity 
3.The term ‘abstraction’ refers to the cognitive process of isolating and scrutinising a 
particular aspect (or aspects) of an object under investigation.
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of this interconnectedness is too great for us to exhaustively 
map in our minds. So, though our functioning at the level 
of naive experience is wonderfully integrated, our attempts 
to design and make things are more detached from this 
layered integration, because we employ abstraction and 
reduction. By definition, therefore, what we make tends in 
the direction of the more limited machine-like dynamics of 
limited cause-and-effect patterns. Machines are typically 
not fully integrated with their environment, therefore they 
disturb rather than partake in the balance4 of things in the 
organic realm. 
This dimension of human design holds true except for in 
those contexts where the regulating interaction of organisms 
is steering that process of design, such as in the structure of 
human organisations. Even here, though, it could be argued 
that we tend to err in the direction of mechanistic resolutions 
to organic problems.5 This is still true of the management-
driven models of organisation of our day, including those 
that believe in employing what are considered to be the 
emergent properties in such systems. Given the mechanistic 
restrictions of physics and human engineering, if there 
are material systems that are not mechanisms, all that 
contemporary physics can do is to tell us what properties 
they cannot have. And as Rosen (1991) puts it:
what must be absent seems devastating. For instance, such a 
system cannot have a state set, built up synthetically from the 
states of minimal models and fixed once and for all. If there is no 
state set, there is certainly no recursion, and hence, no dynamics 
in the ordinary sense of the term. There is accordingly no 
largest model of such a system. And the categories of causation 
in it cannot be segregated into discrete, fixed parts, because 
fractionability itself fails. (p. 242)
This last remark about the absence of fractionability (or the 
lack of accumulation of discrete packages in design) is really 
a core issue in the difference between human engineering 
and the design embodied in organic life.
What it means is that the degree of complexity of biological 
design is typically far greater than a product of human 
engineering with the same number of parts because of the 
more integrated nature of that design, that is, there are more 
established relationships and connections over more scales 
of size without partition into separable packages (everything 
is more authentically connected with everything else6). 
Complexity is not the only characteristic of life, though; 
it is not even its defining characteristic. Rosen would say 
4.‘If all insects on earth disappeared, within 50 years all life on Earth would end. If all 
human beings disappeared from the Earth, within 50 years all forms of life would 
flourish’ (Salk 1983). The implication here is that humans are less in balance with 
their environment than other organisms because they can employ instrumental 
reason to design and shape things (mechanisms) that are less well integrated with 
their environment.
5.Hobbes is of the opinion that the state is an artificial construction (not an organism). 
It depends on agreement, contract, institution and other manifestations of human 
decision: ‘Man, he held, was a natural machine as distinct from Leviathan, which 
was an artificial one’ (Peters, cited in Hobbes 1962:13). 
6.The diversity expressed at the micro level is a reflection of and interrelated with 
the diversity at the macro level, that is, the one is intrinsically dependent on the 
other. The elliptical course of the Earth around the sun linked to the solar system’s 
positioning in the rest of the cosmos, and the off-centre angle of the Earth’s rotation 
around its own axis together with the elliptical course provides for the seasons, the 
varying gravitational pull provided by the moon and the other planets et cetera. This 
kind of interrelation is also found between the big parts of an individual organism 
(the organs) and the structures at the micro/nano-level.
‘complexity7 is not life itself though it is the habitat of life’ 
(Rosen 1991:280). More is needed to distinguish what is 
alive from what is complex; given the complexity of dead 
organisms this should be clear. Biology, amongst other 
things, is relational in the sense that the organisation is 
prioritised over the physics:8 
Organization in its turn inherently involves functions and their 
interrelations; the abandonment of fractionability, however, 
means there is no 1 to 1 relationship between such relational, 
functional organizations and the structures which realize 
them. These are the basic differences between organisms and 
mechanisms or machines. (Rosen 1991:280)
Rosen arguably epitomises the reductionist approach to life, 
as: ‘throw away the organization and keep the underlying 
matter’ (Rosen 1991:126, 127). The relational alternative 
to this, he would say, is the exact opposite, namely: ‘when 
studying an organized material system, throw away the 
matter and keep the underlying organization.’ 
The concepts ‘organism’ and ‘organisation’ are not only 
linked by chance similarity of letters. Their etymological 
linkage gives witness to an age-old insight that the two 
belong together. ‘Organisation’ in our context means 
purpose-directed structure (having teleology) or functionally 
specific structuring. Organisms are characterised, amongst 
other things, by the fact that their parts are organised in a 
functionally specific way. Not only is this organisation 
visible when one looks for it but the functional or relational 
aspect seems to be primary, that is, biological systems 
frequently achieve the same goal by different means, 
whether it be the realising of pain, being in a certain state 
of mind or conquering a bacterial or viral intrusion. The 
embodied organisation would seem to be the organisation of 
functions which are then realised in material organisation – 
the direction of causation being both top-down and bottom-
up, rather than simply bottom-up. What is happening is 
that the top-down (function-oriented) causal processes are 
employing the bottom-up physico-chemical processes to 
achieve their goal. The immunological response would be a 
case in point: it displays a lot of redundancy characterised 
not by a similarity of mechanism but by a similarity of goal 
or function. The essence of biological design seems to be 
found in the relationships of a vast variety of functionalities. 
These functionalities are frequently realisable by various 
physical means. Whilst chaos may be a form of structure, 
even having its own kind of regularity and computability, 
it is not organisation for lack of this goal-oriented dimension 
(see Figure 1).
What Rosen contends is that biological organisms – in contrast 
to mechanisms9 and machines – contain almost everything 
7.Rosen (1998:292) chooses to try to redefine complexity in such a way that it is 
reserved for those systems which are not susceptible to fractionability or other 
reductionistic mathematical tools (systems having at least one non-simulable 
model). He writes: ‘This is essentially what I have called complexity; a system 
(mathematical or physical) is complex to the extent that it does not let itself be 
exhausted within a given set of (subjective) limitations.’ 
8.Rashevsky (1960) elaborates on this understanding of biology. 
9.Chu and Ho (2006:117–134) attempted a rebuttal of Rosen’s argument but 
misrepresented his definition of ‘mechanism’, which makes their attempt 
unsuccessful.
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about their functional organisation within themselves (Rosen 
1991:244). This is in line with Heusinkveld and Jochemsen’s 
(2006:5) assertion that cells have an inwardness. As a result, 
biological organisms can answer ‘why?’ questions about 
components of their functional organisation in terms of 
efficient cause from within this organisation (Gwinn 2007a:1). 
Rosen coined the phrase ‘closed to efficient causation’ (Rosen 
1991:244) to express this feature of organisms which have an 
internal loop of causation that closes out external domino 
effects in the mechanistic sense. What this means is that there 
is top-down causation within an organism which provides 
the reason for why some of the bottom-up chemical processes 
fulfil the function that they do. This is a concept that has 
tremendous implications for biology, physics and science 
in general. It means that to describe the processes inside 
organisms, one has to have models (such as the metabolism-
repair system model (see Figure 1) (Louie 2005:423–436), 
which include impredictive loops of causation. These are 
therefore models that are non-computable, that is, they cannot 
be turned into algorithms for computational processing. 
This flies in the face of the widely held conviction that 
Turing machines (computation-based machines that define 
the limits of mechanical computation) are the ticket to 
developing computation-based models of life and that all 
complexity in the natural order is fractionable. The challenge 
for physics is therefore to create a formalism that is outside 
the realm of simulable recursive functions and therefore is 
not state-based, and is not fully computable, in the Turing 
sense. As Gwinn (2007b:2) points out, there sometimes exists 
a degree of confusion concerning what a Turing machine is 
or is not capable of computing. This uncertainty stems from 
the use of phrases such as ‘more powerful’ when referring 
to certain kinds of computing device, which seem to imply 
a larger scope of computability but in reality refer only to 
speed or efficiency of computation. Also, devices such as 
Cray computers, cellular automata, neural nets and quantum 
computers are unable to compute anything that is outside 
the (theoretical) scope of a Turing machine. Even adding 
‘stochastic’ devices, multiple read or write heads, and so forth, 
to a Turing machine does not allow the enhanced machine 
to compute anything beyond what was already considered 
computable (Gwinn 2007b:2). Turing computability covers 
only the realm of purely rote or algorithmic processes. Such 
processes are completely syntactic, since they are restricted to 
symbol manipulation. In the realm of mathematical systems, 
such systems that do not include semantic elements and are 
entirely describable by rote processes are labelled formalisable. 
It is this feature of formalisability that makes state-based 
modelling possible. State-based descriptions are what all of 
physics rests on (including quantum mechanics), yet they are 
unable to describe systems that possess such impredictive 
loops of causation (Louie 2006:2). Gwinn (2007b) summarises 
Rosen’s conclusion as follows: 
The result is that the limits of description imposed by the 
approaches of computational modelling and by state-based 
physics are entirely artefactual (non-living), and do not represent 
fundamental limits of the material world. With regard to biology, 
those approaches are incapable of answering fundamental 
questions about organisms, such as ‘what is life?’, because they 
are unable to represent the relevant features of the material 
systems we call “organisms” within their formalisms. (p. 2)
It is fair to note that Rosen’s conclusion is not that artificial 
life is impossible. It is, rather, that life is not computable: 
however one models life, whether natural or artificial, one 
cannot succeed by computation alone, would be his position. 
Ultimately he is saying that life is not definable by an 
algorithm, no matter how complex the algorithm is (Louie 
2005:3). This is a conclusion that in fact has some practical 
verification from computer science. Attempts to implement 
a hierarchical closed loop led to deadlock, which is expressly 
forbidden in systems programming (Silberschatz & 
Galvin 1998).
Synthesised life?
The most full-blown attempts to synthesise life and reduce 
organic process to the computable can be found in the recent 
work of the Craig Venter Institute and the Biophysics and 
Bioengineering departments of Stanford University. An 
article entitled: ‘A Whole-cell computational model predicts 
phenotype from genotype’ (Karr et al. 2012:389–401) clearly 
exudes the conviction that life can be fully simulated with 
computer models. 
The article starts with the observation that: ‘[u]nderstanding 
how complex phenotypes arise from individual molecules 
and their interactions is a primary challenge in biology 
that computational approaches are poised to tackle’ (Karr 
et al. 2012:389). Two broadly heralded assumptions are 
evident in this starting point. The first is that ultimately the 
computational reduction of organic life is possible, even if 
there is still a lot of refining to do. The second is that the 
phenotype (the working whole) is somehow produced by 
its molecular parts, rather than that the integrated whole 
steers its reproduction as a kind of control centre. Not only 
is the control situated in the parts rather than the whole, but 
there is a further reduction specifically to the genome (DNA 
molecule) as the steering or controlling entity, even though 
the computational model at hand has included a lot of effort 
to model the perceived products of genome function. One 
sees this reduction of life to the genome in the following 
Source: Adapted from: Louie, A.H., 2005, ‘Any material realization of the (M,R)-systems must 
have non-computable models’, Journal of Integrative Neuroscience 4(4), 423–436. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219635205000926, PMid:16385638
FIGURE 1: Every function is entailed by another internal function.
Material cause
Efficient cause
Metabolism repair system with replication
Alternative notation
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quotation: ‘Moreover, these findings, in combination with the 
recent de novo synthesis of the M. genitalium chromosome 
and successful genome transplantation of Mycoplasma 
genomes to produce a synthetic cell (Gibson et al. 2008, 2010; 
Lartigue et al. 2007, 2009), raise the exciting possibility of 
using whole-cell models to enable computer-aided rational 
design of novel microorganisms’ (Karr et al. 2012:399). The 
quick jump from a synthesised DNA molecule (which is not 
designed but copied from biological design) to therefore 
having created a synthesised cell is clearly a blind spot that 
has its roots in the reduction of life to the genotype. It has to 
be stressed that the genome does not replicate itself; in fact, it 
does nearly nothing by itself. It is rather replicated by the cell 
as a working whole.
The tendency to look at the represented code as the ultimate 
driver loose from the rest of the cell is even more painfully 
clear when one sees how the weight discrepancy between the 
DNA and the total Mycoplasma chromosome is perceived: 
Most of these parameters were implemented as originally 
reported. However, several other parameters were carefully 
reconciled; for example, the experimentally measured DNA 
content per cell (Morowitz et al., 1962; Morowitz, 1992) 
represents less than one-third of the calculated mass of the 
Mycoplasma chromosome. Data S1 details how we resolved 
this and several similar discrepancies among the experimentally 
observed parameters. (Karr et al. 2012:391)
At the one point in the article where the authors give 
evidence of bumping into another source of steering than 
simply the genome, the vocabulary of emergence is evoked: 
‘The whole-cell model therefore presents a hypothesis of an 
emergent control of cell-cycle duration that is independent of 
genetic regulation’ (Karr et al. 2012:393). The implication of 
this is that the regulation of timing is produced by bottom-
up complex interactions rather than that the embodied 
pattern or organisation situated in the whole is steering in 
any way. Seeing the way that the vocabulary of emergence 
is employed here, one can conclude that the reduction to 
mechanistic cause and effect is accompanied by a physicalist 
or even a simply materialist ontology.
A final observation about the mechanismic underpinnings of 
this research into cell function is the assumption that the cell 
and the genome are fundamentally fractionable. In their own 
words: 
Our approach to developing an integrative whole-cell model 
was to divide the total functionality of the cell into modules, 
model each independently of the others, and integrate these sub 
models together. (Karr et al. 2012:389)
In terms of both the independence of the various functions 
in the cell and the perceived genetic units that govern these 
functions, there is a very real reduction going on when it 
becomes clear that this computational model is not just a 
tool for learning (which it has proven to be useful for), but 
is also seen as a preliminary blueprint for the design of 
novel organisms. The genome is neither truly divided into 
discrete packages nor are the parts of the cell functioning 
independently.
Computability is not the only difference between things 
made by humans and natural organisms, though. There are 
more reasons to tread carefully in the realm of asserting the 
human capacity to design organismic or life-like things. The 
fundamental differences between human design and the 
designs embodied in biology are numerous:
1. The unicity (which is not superficial) of each thing that is 
replicated.
2. The law of the loss of information (if we create a machine 
to make pans, the machine will always require more 
information to describe it than the pans it makes). 
Biological design does not suffer from this loss.
3. We remain the operators and directors of the things we 
make; biology produces systems with inwardness, self-
governed operation and adaptation.
4. Integration and wholeness (cohesion) – we make systems 
that are a clear product of the specialisation of attention: 
one thing made up of many parts. Biology, on the other 
hand, makes everything, starting from a single cell. (We 
interact with DNA as though one piece of DNA deals with 
one function. Biology, though, proves to employ endless 
feedback loops to use and re-use parts of its genetic code, 
which in the end results in everything being connected 
to everything in such a way that real specialisation in the 
analysis of the genome leads to a loss of understanding 
and not a gain.) 
5. Biology uses redundancy and is flexible in the means of 
achieving a function (one function can fill in for another) 
and self-repair (healing) – the mechanical systems we 
make do not repair themselves, they need to be repaired. 
Take note that the relevant comparison is not between 
what a computer does with software or data, but with 
what those systems do with matter which we have 
programmed, that is, a car or the computer itself (not just 
the code or the programming. This is a similar kind of 
reduction of reality as the reduction of traits to DNA).
6. Biology gathers its own raw materials and processes, and 
re-uses or jettisons its own waste products.
7. Diversity seems to be a crucial feature of the functioning 
of biological (organic) systems, together forming a greater 
system (e.g. atmosphere), which allows for stability and 
life. This increases the complexity in a way that is not 
scale thin.10 Human creations tend to be made in isolation, 
for example, more mono-dimensional, thus restricting 
themselves to the realm of mechanism.
These differences have been a reason for some people in 
microbiology and the nanotech sector to take a more careful 
position than the line of the Craig Venter Institute or that of 
Drexler (1986), set out in his ‘Engines of Creation’. As Harper 
puts it with reference to the ethics of the human capacity 
to design organismic things: ‘For any threat from the nano 
world to become a danger, it would have to include far more 
10.Shostak (1998:190): ‘[T]he biosphere of the earth is … a cybernetic system 
possessing the properties of self regulation. A cybernetic system “possesses 
stability for blocking external and internal disturbances when it has sufficient 
internal diversity”. Diversity on earth is provided in part by such things as its 
rotation around the sun, and around its own axis (creating latitudinal and seasonal 
change), and by the range of elevation and depth of the surface. But the main 
diversity of the earth’s biosphere is created by living organisms. This internal 
diversity of the biosphere created by life: “provides a definite guarantee for the 
preservation of life on our planet”.’
Original Research
doi:10.4102/koers.v78i2.1240http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 7 of 8
intelligence and flexibility than we can possibly design into 
it’ (Harper 2003:4). As he sees it:
Nature has the ability to design highly energy efficient systems 
that operate precisely and without waste, fix only that which 
needs fixing, do only that which needs doing, and no more. 
We do not although one day our understanding of nanoscale 
phenomena may allow us to replicate at least part of what nature 
accomplishes. (Harper 2003:4)
The lack of a clear understanding and distinction between 
the mechanistic nature of our creations versus the organic 
integration of the things we have not designed leads to an 
unwarranted optimism about our ability to design in the 
realm of the biological. Though we are organisms, what 
we make is more machine-like and less organism-like than 
we would like to admit – especially when self-replicating 
systems look like such an enticing possibility.
Reduction and synthetic life
Few human endeavours have met with as much ‘opposition’ 
from the natural order as the attempts to design phenotype 
self-replicating systems. Yet much of the recent rhetoric of the 
nanotech community has taken it for granted that this goal 
is achievable by humans because the phenomenon occurs in 
the natural world. These two things do not naturally flow 
from one another, though. The potential thought mistake is 
that because organisms are expressed in matter, all they are 
is matter. Even the attempt to employ emergent behaviour 
as a way of circumventing our design shortcomings is an 
extension of the reductionistic11 view that all that organisms 
are made of is matter. In this view, the primary barrier to 
being able to make organism-like things is the limit on our 
capacity to manipulate all the parts of matter, which with 
nanotech indeed comes closer. Features such as the capacity 
of organisms to maintain identity whilst moving through 
various substrates of matter, even replacing every part of 
the whole, should warn against such reductions. This has 
led to a consistent trend in the efforts of nanotechnology to 
invest in the achieving of self-replication (which is akin to 
life) and for the ethics community to make that its primary 
focus for evaluating the activities of nanotech. This still holds 
true, as evidenced by the following quotation from Turney 
and Ewaschuk’s (2006) article on ‘Self-replication and self-
assembly for manufacturing’:
It has been argued that a central objective of nanotechnology is 
to make products inexpensively, and that self-replication is an 
effective approach to very low-cost manufacturing. The research 
presented here is intended to be a step towards this vision. (p. 411)
The qualitative and quantitative difference between the 
kind of design that humans produce and the kind of 
designs which are expressed in biological organisms should 
caution us to take seriously the option that we have design 
limitations which may fundamentally stand in the way of 
achieving these goals. There is evidence of more raw material 
than just matter and energy. The immaterial constituents of 
11.Weinberg (2001:115) is a well-known advocate of reductionist explanation. Whilst 
he believes that phenomena such as life and mind come about through emergence, 
he asserts that ‘[t]he rules they obey are not independent truths, but follow from 
scientific principles at a deeper level’. What he means by ‘deeper’ in this context is 
at the lower level of the constituent physical parts.
life and intelligence may form a more formidable barrier to 
overcome than simply achieving the capacity to manipulate 
all that there is to matter (though even this may be a lot more 
difficult than many of us are suggesting, given the uncertain 
nature of the material constituents). One of the reasons that 
the immaterial constituents of biological systems (organisms) 
have largely been ignored is the predominantly Cartesian 
model of reality with its machine analogy, which has shaped 
the landscape for most of what has been called science in the 
modern era. 
Even in the journal Artificial Life, which is devoted to 
everything that is involved in ‘our rapidly increasing 
technological ability to synthesize life-like behaviours 
from scratch in computers, machines, molecules, 
and other alternative media’, one author has had to 
acknowledge that the present state of affairs is that ‘[e]
lectronic systems, no matter how clever and intelligent 
they are, cannot yet demonstrate the reliability that 
biological systems can’ (Zhang, Dragffy & Pipe 2006:313). 
With regard to all the computer- and electronics-based 
attempts at simulating life, it needs to be observed that, 
given the lack of computability of real life, the fabrication 
of something (e.g. an organism) is a vastly different matter 
than the simulation of its behaviours. Louie argues that ‘the 
pursuit of the latter represents the ancient tradition that used 
to be called bio mimesis, the imitation of life’ (Louie 2006:6). 
The idea that underlies the attempts to achieve life through 
simulation models is:
that by serially endowing a machine with more and more of 
the simulacra of life, we would cross a threshold beyond which 
the machine would become an organism. The same reasoning 
is embodied in the artificial intelligence of today, and it is 
articulated in Turing’s Test. This activity is a sophisticated kind 
of curve-fitting, akin to the assertion that since a given curve 
can be approximated by a polynomial, it must be a polynomial. 
(Louie 2006:6)
Conclusion
Though the distinctive nature of a mechanism is hard to 
capture, it would seem that the core meaning load of the 
concept ‘mechanism’ is to be found in the kind of causality 
which is functioning at the physical level – that Dooyeweerd 
(2002:94) situates in the four pre-biotic aspects of reality: 
quantitative, spatial, kinematic and physical. Here the 
bottom-up causality is definitive. The relatively limited and 
linear nature of the complexity of these processes seems to 
mirror our own limited ability to model and design things. 
The more layered kind of steering that organic causal 
processes employ to limit all possible physico-chemical 
outcomes to a specific set that is functional, would seem 
more interconnected than our own making.
One of the paradoxes of our time is that both organismic 
and mechanismic worldviews are prevalent, both appealing 
to science in their own way. The mechanismic account of 
causal processes in reality seems more prevalent, though, 
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and defines the way in which we currently invest in research. 
The risk that absolutising either of these accounts of causal 
processes holds is that one gets caught in a reductionism 
that leads to a loss of understanding. The limitations of the 
various attempts to synthesise life on the basis of mechanistic 
computational models, computing from the bottom up and 
starting with the laws for interaction at the smallest level, 
should signal the very real possibility that there is more raw 
material to reality than is being captured in the computational, 
mechanistic approach. An alternative perspective that allows 
for top-down causal processes such as the organic, which 
employ the bottom-up physical-chemical processes, would 
seem more likely to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism. Causal 
processes may be situated in multiple layers of reality.
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